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Abstract—We propose a private information retrieval (PIR)
protocol for distributed storage systems with noncolluding nodes
where data is stored using an arbitrary linear code. An expression
for the PIR rate, i.e., the ratio of the amount of retrieved data
per unit of downloaded data, is derived, and a necessary and a
sufficient condition for codes to achieve the maximum distance
separable (MDS) PIR capacity are given. The necessary condition
is based on the generalized Hamming weights of the storage code,
while the sufficient condition is based on code automorphisms.
We show that cyclic codes and Reed-Muller codes satisfy the
sufficient condition and are thus MDS-PIR capacity-achieving.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) was first addressed by
Chor et al. in the computer science community [1]. A PIR
protocol allows the users to privately retrieve any requested file
stored in a set of servers (referred to as nodes in the sequel)
without revealing to the nodes which file is actually being
downloaded. The efficiency of a PIR protocol is measured
in terms of the overall communication cost, defined as the
sum of the upload and the download cost, and the goal is to
design a protocol that minimizes it. Recently, PIR for coded
distributed storage systems (DSSs) where data is encoded by a
linear code and then stored across nodes has attracted a great
deal of attention [2]–[7].
Assuming that the size of the files stored in the DSS
is much larger than the number of files stored, the upload
cost is small compared to the download cost [4], [5], and
thus it can be ignored. The PIR rate is then defined as the
amount of information retrieved per downloaded symbol and
is the measure of efficiency used in the information theory
community. For the so-called uncoded PIR problem, where
the system can be seen as a coded DSS using a repetition
code, the authors in [8], [9] derived an exact expression for the
maximum possible PIR rate over all possible PIR protocols,
i.e., the PIR capacity. A closed-form expression for the coded
PIR capacity when no nodes collude was derived in [10] for the
case where data is encoded by a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code and then stored. The PIR capacity in this case is
usually referred to as MDS-PIR capacity. Most of the earlier
works focus on studying PIR schemes for DSSs where data is
stored using an MDS code. A PIR protocol for DSSs where
data is stored using an arbitrary linear code was considered in
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[6] for the case of noncolluding nodes, and it was shown that
the asymptotic MDS-PIR capacity (assuming that an infinite
number of files are stored) can be achieved even when the
underlying code is non-MDS. PIR with linear codes for the
case of colluding nodes was addressed in [7], [11], [12]. A
conjecture for the MDS-PIR capacity in the colluding case
was stated in [7], but disproved for 2 files in [13]. However,
in other cases (e.g., in the asymptotic case), it is still open.
In this paper, we propose a PIR protocol for DSSs where
data is stored using an arbitrary linear code for the case of
noncolluding nodes. Furthermore, we investigate which classes
of codes can achieve the MDS-PIR capacity with the proposed
protocol. Specifically, we derive an expression for the PIR
rate by exploiting a number of coordinate sets containing
information sets of the underlying storage code, and define
a class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, which includes
MDS codes. We also provide a necessary and a sufficient
condition for a code to achieve the MDS-PIR capacity with the
given PIR protocol. The necessary condition is connected to
the generalized Hamming weights of the storage code, while
the sufficient condition is related to code automorphisms. We
show that cyclic codes and Reed-Muller (RM) codes satisfy the
sufficient condition and are thus MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
codes. In the following, all proofs are omitted due to lack of
space. The proofs can be found in the extended version [11].
Notation: We use N for the set of all positive integers,
Na , {1, 2, . . . , a}, and Nn1:n2 , {n1, n1+1, . . . , n2} for two
positive integers n1 ≤ n2, n1, n2 ∈ N. Vectors are denoted
by lower case bold letters, matrices by upper case bold letters,
and sets by calligraphic upper case letters, e.g., x, X , and X
denote a vector, a matrix, and a set, respectively. C will denote
a linear code over the finite field GF(q). We use the customary
code parameters [n, k] or [n, k, dCmin] to denote a code C of
blocklength n, dimension k, and minimum Hamming distance
dCmin. (·)T represents the transpose of its argument, while
(X1| . . . |Xa) represents the horizontal concatenation of the
matrices X1, . . . ,Xa, all with the same number of rows. The
function H(·) represents the entropy of its argument and χ(x)
denotes the support of a vector x. Subscripts may be omitted
if the arguments we refer to are contextually unambiguous.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first review some notions in coding theory
and then give the system model and the privacy model.
A. Definitions
Definition 1: Let C be an [n, k] code with generator matrix
GC , and denote by GC |I the matrix consisting of the columns
of GC indexed by I. A set of coordinates of C, I ⊆ Nn, of
size k is said to be an information set if and only if GC |I is
invertible.
Definition 2: Let D be a subcode of an [n, k] code C. The
support of D is defined as
χ(D) , {j ∈ Nn : ∃x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D, xj 6= 0}.
Definition 3 (Generalized Hamming weight [14]): The s-
th generalized Hamming weight of an [n, k] code C, denoted
by dCs , s ∈ Nk, is defined as the cardinality of the smallest
support of an s-dimensional subcode of C, i.e.,
dCs , min
{|χ(D)| : D is an [n, s] subcode of C}.
B. System Model
We consider a DSS that stores f files X(1), . . . ,X(f),
where each file X(m) = (x(m)i,j ), m ∈ Nf , can be seen as a
β × k matrix over GF(q) with β, k ∈ N. Each file is encoded
using a linear code as follows. Let x(m)i =
(
x
(m)
i,1 , . . . , x
(m)
i,k
)
,
i ∈ Nβ , be a message vector corresponding to the i-th row of
X(m). Each x(m)i is encoded by an [n, k] code C over GF(q)
into a length-n codeword c(m)i =
(
c
(m)
i,1 , . . . , c
(m)
i,n
)
, where
c
(m)
i,j ∈ GF(q), j ∈ Nn. The βf generated codewords c(m)i
are then arranged in the array C =
(
(C(1))T| . . . |(C(f))T)T of
dimensions βf×n, where C(m) = ((c(m)1 )T| . . . |(c(m)β )T)T for
m ∈ Nf . For a given column j of C, we denote the column
vector
(
c
(m)
1,j , . . . , c
(m)
β,j
)T
as a coded chunk pertaining to file
X(m). The f coded chunks in column j are stored on the j-th
storage node, j ∈ Nn.
C. Privacy Model
We consider a DSS where a node may act as spy. It is
assumed that the remaining nonspy nodes do not collaborate
with the spy node. The scenario of one spy node is analogous
to having a system with no colluding nodes. To retrieve file
X(m) from the DSS, the user sends a d × βf query matrix
Q(l) over GF(q), for some integer d, to the l-th node for all
l ∈ Nn. In response to the received query, node l sends the
response vector rl, which is a deterministic function of Q(l)
and the code symbols stored in the node l, back to the user.
Definition 4: Consider a DSS with n nodes storing f files in
which a single node acts as spy. A user who wishes to retrieve
the m-th file sends the queries Q(l), l ∈ Nn, to the storage
nodes, which return the responses rl. This scheme achieves
perfect information-theoretic PIR if and only if
Privacy: H
(
m|Q(l)) = H(m), ∀ l ∈ Nn; (1a)
Recovery: H
(
X(m)|r1, . . . , rn
)
= 0. (1b)
Queries satisfying (1a) ensure that the spy node is not able
to determine which file is being downloaded by the user. The
recovery constraint in (1b) ensures that the user is able to
recover the requested file from the responses sent by the DSS.
Definition 5: The PIR rate of a PIR protocol, denoted by R,
is the amount of information retrieved per downloaded symbol,
i.e., R , βk
D
, where D is the total number of downloaded
symbols for the retrieval of a single file.
We will write R(C) to highlight that the PIR rate depends
on the underlying storage code C. The maximum achievable
PIR rate is the PIR capacity. It was shown in [10] that for the
noncolluding case and for a given number of files f stored
using an [n, k] MDS code, the MDS-PIR capacity, denoted by
Cf , is
Cf ,
n− k
n
[
1−
(k
n
)f]−1
. (2)
III. CAPACITY-ACHIEVING PIR PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a PIR protocol that achieves the
MDS-PIR capacity for the scenario of noncolluding nodes.
The protocol is inspired by the protocol introduced in [10].
A. PIR Achievable Rate Matrix
In [8], the concept of exploiting side information for PIR
problems was introduced. By side information we mean ad-
ditional redundant symbols not related to the requested file
but downloaded by the user in order to maintain privacy.
These symbols can be exploited by the user to retrieve the
requested file from the responses of the storage nodes. In
[10, Sec. V.A], it was shown that for a [5, 3, 3] MDS storage
code, the side information is decoded by utilizing other code
coordinates forming an information set in the code array.
For instance, the authors chose the ν = 5 information sets
I1 = {1, 2, 3}, I2 = {1, 4, 5}, I3 = {2, 3, 4}, I4 = {1, 2, 5},
and I5 = {3, 4, 5} of the [5, 3, 3] MDS code in their PIR
achievable scheme. Observe that in {Ii}i∈N5 each coordinate
of the [5, 3, 3] code appears exactly κ = 3 times. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 6: Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code. A ν × n
binary matrix Λκ,ν(C) is said to be a PIR achievable rate
matrix for C if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of Λκ,ν is κ, and
2) for each matrix row λi, i ∈ Nν , χ(λi) always contains
an information set.
In other words, each coordinate j of C, j ∈ Nn, appears
exactly κ times in {χ(λi)}i∈Nν , and every set χ(λi) contains
an information set.
Lemma 1: If a matrix Λκ,ν(C) exists for an [n, k] code C,
then we have
κ
ν
≥ k
n
,
where equality holds if χ(λi), i ∈ Nν , are all information sets.
Example 1: Consider the [5, 3, 2] code with generator matrix
G =
1 0 0 1 00 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
.
One can easily verify that
Λ2,3 =
0 1 1 1 11 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0

is a PIR achievable rate matrix for this code.
Before we state our main results, in order to clearly illustrate
the PIR protocol, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 7: For a given ν×n PIR achievable rate matrix
Λκ,ν(C) = (λu,j), we define the PIR interference matrices
Aκ×n = (ai,j) and B(ν−κ)×n = (bi,j) with
ai,j , u if λu,j = 1, ∀ j ∈ Nn, i ∈ Nκ, u ∈ Nν ,
bi,j , u if λu,j = 0, ∀ j ∈ Nn, i ∈ Nν−κ, u ∈ Nν .
Note that in Definition 7, for each j ∈ Nn, distinct values
of u ∈ Nν should be assigned for all i. Thus, the assignment
is not unique in the sense that the order of the entries of
each column of A and B can be permuted. For j ∈ Nn, let
Aj , {ai,j : i ∈ Nκ} and Bj , {bi,j : i ∈ Nν−κ}. Note that
the j-th column of A contains the row indices of Λ whose
entries in the j-th column are equal to 1, while B contains the
remaining row indices of Λ. Hence, it can be observed that
Bj = Nν \ Aj , ∀ j ∈ Nn.
Definition 8: By S(a|Aκ×n) we denote the set of column
coordinates of matrix Aκ×n = (ai,j) for which at least one
of its entries is equal to a, i.e.,
S(a|Aκ×n) , {j ∈ Nn : ∃ ai,j = a, i ∈ Nκ}.
The following claim can be directly verified.
Claim 1: S(a|Aκ×n) contains an information set ∀ a ∈
Nν . Moreover, for an arbitrary entry bi,j of B(ν−κ)×n,
S(bi,j |Aκ×n) ⊆ Nn \ {j} and it must contain an information
set.
We illustrate the previous points in the following example.
Example 2: Continuing with Example 1 and following
Definition 7, we obtain
A2×5 =
(
2 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 2 2
)
and B1×5 =
(
1 2 2 3 3
)
for Λ2,3. One can see that Aj∪Bj = N3, ∀ j ∈ N5. Moreover,
for instance, take a = 1, then S(1|A2×5) = {2, 3, 4, 5}
contains an information set of the [5, 3, 2] systematic code of
Example 1.
Now consider the two matrices
c
(m)
µ+a1,1,1
c
(m)
µ+a1,2,2
· · · c(m)µ+a1,n,n
...
c
(m)
µ+aκ,1,1
c
(m)
µ+aκ,2,2
· · · c(m)µ+aκ,n,n
 and

c
(m)
µ+b1,1,1
c
(m)
µ+b1,2,2
· · · c(m)µ+b1,n,n
...
c
(m)
µ+bν−κ,1,1 c
(m)
µ+bν−κ,2,2 · · · c
(m)
µ+bν−κ,n,n

of code symbols of the m-th file, where µ ∈ Nβ−ν ∪ {0}.
Observe that if the user knows the first matrix of code symbols,
from Claim 1, since the coordinate set S(bi,j |Aκ×n) ⊆
Nn \ {j} contains an information set and the user knows the
structure of the storage code C, the code symbols c(m)µ+bi,j ,j of
the second matrix can be obtained. Here, the entries of A and
B are respectively marked in red and blue. The actual PIR
protocol is stated below.
B. PIR Protocol
The proposed PIR protocol generalizes the MDS-coded PIR
protocol in [10] to DSSs where files are stored using an
arbitrary linear code. Inspired by [8] and [10], a PIR capacity-
achievable scheme should follow two important principles:
1) enforcing file symmetry within each storage node, and 2)
exploiting side information of undesired symbols to retrieve
new desired symbols.1
The PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν for the given storage
code C plays a central role in the proposed PIR protocol.
Moreover, the protocol requires β = νf stripes and ex-
ploits the corresponding PIR interference matrices Aκ×n and
B(ν−κ)×n. Here, we simply outline the steps of the protocol.
Its detailed exposition and corresponding proofs are given in
[11, Sec. IV-B and App. B]. A particular example is also
given in the extended version [11, Sec. IV-D]. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the user wants to download the
first file, i.e., m = 1. The algorithm is composed of four steps
as described below.
Step 1. Index Preparation: For all files, the user interleaves
the indices of the rows of C(m) randomly and independently
of each other and generates the interleaved code array Y (m) =(
(y
(m)
1 )
T| . . . |(y(m)β )T
)T
, ∀m ∈ Nf , with rows
y
(m)
i = c
(m)
pi(i), i ∈ Nβ ,
where pi(·) : Nβ → Nβ is a random permutation, which is
privately known to the user only. Therefore, when the user
requests code symbols from each storage node, this procedure
is designed to make the requested row indices to be random
and independent of the requested file index.
Step 2. Download Symbols in the i-th Repetition: The user
downloads the needed symbols in κ repetitions. In the i-th
repetition, i ∈ Nκ, the user downloads the required symbols
in a total of f rounds. Using the terminology in [10], the
user downloads two types of symbols, desired symbols, which
are directly related to the requested file index m = 1, and
undesired symbols, which are not related to the requested file
index m = 1, but are exploited to decode the requested file
from the desired symbols. For the desired symbols, we will
distinguish between round ` = 1 and round ` ∈ N2:f .
Undesired symbols. The undesired symbols refer to sums of
code symbols which do not contain symbols from the re-
quested file. For every round `, ` ∈ Nf−1, the user downloads
the code symbols{ ∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`−1))·ν+a1,j ,j ,
. . . ,
∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`−1))·ν+aκ,j ,j ,
. . . ,
∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`)−1)·ν+a1,j ,j ,
1In [8] and [10], a third principle was introduced, namely enforcing
symmetry across storage nodes. However, this is in general not a necessary
requirement for a feasible PIR protocol.
. . . ,
∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`)−1)·ν+aκ,j ,j
}
for all j ∈ Nn and for all possible subsets M⊆ N2:f , where
|M| = ` and U(`) ,∑`h=1 κf−(h+1)(ν − κ)h−1.
In contrast to undesired symbols, desired symbols are sums of
code symbols which contain symbols of the requested file.
The main idea of the protocol is that the user downloads
desired symbols that are linear sums of requested symbols
and undesired symbols from the previous round.
Desired symbols in the first round. In the first round, the
user downloads κ · U(1) = κκf−(1+1)(ν − κ)1−1 = κf−1
undesired symbols from each storage node. However, these
symbols cannot be exploited directly. Hence, due to symmetry,
in round ` = 1, the user downloads the κf−1 desired symbols{
y
(1)
κf−1(ai,j−1)+1,j , . . . , y
(1)
κf−1(ai,j−1)+κf−1,j
}
from the j-th storage node, j ∈ Nn, i.e., the user also
downloads κf−1 symbols for m = 1 from each storage node.
Desired symbols in higher rounds. In the (`+ 1)-th round,
` ∈ Nf−1, in order to exploit the side information, i.e.,
the undesired symbols from the previous round, the user
downloads the symbols{
y
(1)
D(`−1)·ν+ai,j ,j
+
∑
m′∈M1
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`−1))·ν+b1,j ,j ,
. . . , y
(1)
(D(`−1)+(ν−κ)−1)·ν+ai,j ,j
+
∑
m′∈M1
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`−1))·ν+bν−κ,j ,j ,
. . . , y
(1)[
D(`−1)+(U(`)−U(`−1))(ν−κ)−1
]
·ν+ai,j ,j
+
∑
m′∈M1
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`)−1)·ν+bν−κ,j ,j ,
. . . , y
(1)
(D(`)−1)·ν+ai,j ,j
+
∑
m′∈MN(`)
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`)−1)·ν+bν−κ,j ,j
}
for all distinct `-sized subsetsM1, . . . ,MN(`) ⊆ N2:f , where
j ∈ Nn, N(`) ,
(
f−1
`
)
, and
D(`) , κf−1 +
∑`
h=1
(
f − 1
h
)
κf−(h+1)(ν − κ)h.
This indicates that for each combination of files Ml, l ∈
NN(`), the user downloads
[
U(`)− 1−U(`− 1) + 1](ν − κ)
new desired symbols from each storage node, and since
there are in total N(`) combinations of files, in each round
D(`)−1−D(`−1)+1 extra desired symbols are downloaded
from each storage node.
Exploiting the side information. Using the fact that for a
linear code C any linear combination of codewords is also
a codeword, and together with Claim 1, it is not too hard to
see that by fixing an arbitrary coordinate j ∈ Nn, there always
exist some coordinates S ⊂ Nn \ {j} (see Claim 1) such that
for a subset M ⊆ N2:f with |M| = `, the so-called aligned
sum { ∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`−1))·ν+b1,j ,j ,
. . . ,
∑
m′∈M
y
(m′)
((i−1)U(f−1)+U(`)−1)·ν+bν−κ,j ,j
}
for ` ∈ Nf−1 and i ∈ Nκ, can be decoded. Consequently, in
the (`+1)-th round, from each storage node j we can collect
code symbols related to m = 1 from the desired symbols, i.e.,{
y
(1)
D(`−1)·ν+ai,j ,j , . . . , y
(1)
(D(`)−1)·ν+ai,j ,j
}
is obtained.
Step 3. Complete κ Repetitions: The user repeats Step 2
until i = κ. We can show that by our designed parameters
U(`) and D(`), the user indeed downloads in total β = νf
stripes for the requested file (see [11, App. B]).
Step 4. Shuffling the Order of Queries to Each Node: The
order of the queries to each storage node is uniformly shuffled
to prevent the storage node to be able to identify which file is
requested from the index of the first downloaded symbol.
C. Achievable PIR Rate
The PIR rate, R(C), of the protocol proposed in Sec-
tion III-B for a DSS where f files are stored using an arbitrary
[n, k] code C is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to
store f files. If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) exists,
then the PIR rate
R(C) = (ν − κ)k
κn
[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
(3)
is achievable.
Proof: See [11, App. B].
We remark that from Lemma 1, (3) is smaller than or equal
to the MDS-PIR capacity (2) since
R(C) =
νk
κn
[
1− κν
][
1− (κν )f] =
νk
κn
[
1 +
κ
ν
+ · · ·+
(κ
ν
)f−1]−1
≤
[
1 +
k
n
+ · · ·+
(k
n
)f−1]−1
, (4)
and it becomes the MDS-PIR capacity (2) if there exists a
matrix Λκ,ν for C with κν = kn . The inequality in (4) follows
from Lemma 1.
Corollary 1: If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) with
κ
ν =
k
n exists for an [n, k] code C, then the MDS-PIR capacity
(2) is achievable.
Definition 9: A PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) with
κ
ν =
k
n for an [n, k] code C is called an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix, and C is referred to as an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving code.
Note that the largest achievable PIR rate in the noncolluding
case where data is stored using an arbitrary linear code is still
unknown. Interestingly, it is observed from Lemma 1 and (4)
that the largest possible achievable PIR rate for an arbitrary
linear code with the proposed protocol strongly depends on
the smallest possible value of κν for which a PIR achievable
rate matrix Λκ,ν exists. We also remark here that when we
say that an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix Λκ,ν exists,
it does not necessarily require (ν, κ) = (n, k), but κν =
k
n .
A lower bound on the largest possible achievable PIR rate
obtained from Theorem 1 and [11, Lem. 3] is given as follows.
Corollary 2: Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k, dCmin] code
C to store f files. Then, the PIR rate
R(C) = min
(
k, dCmin − 1
)
n
[
1−
( k
k +min
(
k, dCmin − 1
))f]−1
is achievable.
We remark that because every set of k coordinates of an
[n, k] MDS code is an information set, we can construct n
information sets by cyclically shifting an arbitrary information
set n times, hence an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix
Λk,n of an MDS code can be easily constructed. In other
words, the proposed protocol with MDS codes is MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving (see Corollary 1) and MDS codes are a
class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes.
IV. MDS-PIR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING CODES
In this section, we provide a necessary and a sufficient
condition for an arbitrary linear code to achieve the MDS-PIR
capacity Cf (see (2)) with the PIR protocol in Section III-B.
Theorem 2: If an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix exists
for an [n, k] code C, then
dCs ≥
n
k
s, ∀ s ∈ Nk. (5)
Proof: See the proof of [11, Th. 3].
Based on the necessary condition, it can be shown that the
code C in Example 1 is not MDS-PIR capacity-achieving with
the PIR protocol in Section III-B, since dC2 = 3 <
5
3 · 2, i.e., it
is impossible to find an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix
Λκ,ν for this code.
We have performed an exhaustive search for codes with
parameters k ∈ Nn and n ∈ N11 (except for [n, k] = [10, 5]
and [n, k] = [11, 4 ≤ k ≤ 7]) and seen that for codes
satisfying (5), there always exists an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix. Therefore, we conjecture that (5) is an if and
only if condition for the existence of an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix.
Conjecture 1: An MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix
Λκ,ν(C) with κν = kn exists for an [n, k] code C if and only if
(5) holds.
In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving codes by using the code automor-
phisms of an [n, k] code [15, Ch. 8].
Theorem 3: Given an [n, k] code C, if there exist n distinct
automorphisms pi1, . . . , pin of C such that for every code
coordinate j ∈ Nn, {pi1(j), . . . , pin(j)} = Nn, then the code
C is an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code.
Proof: See the proof of [11, Th. 4].
Using their known code automorphisms and Theorem 3, it
can be shown that the families of cyclic codes and RM codes
achieve the MDS-PIR capacity.
Corollary 3: Cyclic codes and RM codes are MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving codes.
It can be easily shown that cyclic codes and RM codes
satisfy the necessary condition of Theorem 2.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a PIR protocol for DSSs where data is stored
using an arbitrary linear code for the case of noncolluding
nodes. By exploiting the information sets of the underlying
storage code, an exact expression for the PIR rate of the
protocol was derived. Furthermore, a necessary and a suffi-
cient condition for a code to be MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
were provided. We proved that cyclic codes and RM codes
satisfy the sufficient condition and thus achieve the MDS-PIR
capacity with the proposed protocol.
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